WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY AND THE MOTHERHOOD PENALTY: EVIDENCE FROM THE DIFFUSION OF REMOTE WORK

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Remote Work Conference
Stanford University, 28 October 2026

Motivation

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  - Mothers experience large and persistent earnings losses after childbirth.
- Research question: do these losses depend on rigid workplace organization?
- Rigid jobs impose commuting, physical presence, and scheduling constraints.
  - Higher flexiblity might lift some of these constraints

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  - WFH is a measurable margin of broader workplace flexibility.
- We combine administrative data sources that are usually separate.
  - WFH contracts, employer–employee records, parent links, fertility records.
- We exploit heterogeneous exposure to remote work across sector–location cells.
  - Use this as an instrument for actual WFH contracts.
- The design compares more and less exposed mothers before and after 2019.

Contribution

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2. **WFH, worker outcomes, and household decisions.**
   (Bloom et al., 2015; Barrero et al., 2023; Aksoy et al., 2026)

   → WFH effects are state-dependent, not a uniform premium.
   → They concentrate around parenthood and depend on household constraints.
   → Causal evidence on WFH and fertility.

DATA AND IDENTIFICATION

Data, Samples, and Outcomes

- Four administrative data sources are combined.
  1. UCA records identify working mothers and link fathers and children via family registries.
  2. Employer–employee records cover individual labor market outcomes.
  3. WFH contracts ("lavoro agile"), observed at the firm $\times$ gender $\times$ age $\times$ citizenship level.
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- Main sample: first-time mothers giving birth from 2016 to 2023.
  - 796,174 working mothers; 428,397 double-earner linked households.
- Outcomes are measured after childbirth and around the birth event.
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- Additional panels study fertility decisions and lifecycle gender gaps.

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$$\text{Remotable}_{s(i)} = \text{WFH potential}_{j(i)} \times \text{Broadband}_{\ell(i),2019}$$

- Captures firms' ability to go remote, driven by task composition and local infrastructure.

Empirical Strategy

- Event-study difference-in-differences around the post-2019 WFH diffusion.

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_{s(i)} + \lambda_t + \sum_{k=2016}^{2024} \beta_k 1\{t = k\} \times \text{Remotable}_{s(i)} + \sum_{k=2016}^{2024} \gamma_k 1\{t = k\} \times X_{\tilde{s}(i)} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

  - i indexes mothers, t is childbirth year, and $s(i)$ is the sector–location cell.
  - $\alpha_{s(i)}$ absorbs permanent sector–location differences; λ_t absorbs aggregate year shocks.
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- Static IV: instrument WFH take-up with post-2019 exposure to remotability.
- $\text{Remotable}_{s(i)}$ rescaled to capture effect of moving from p10 to p90.
- In practice: DiD design on a repeated cross-section of mothers.

Main table

Identification Threats and Checks

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
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- Third concern: WFH may change the composition of women becoming mothers.
  - We net out pre-birth earnings (earnings potential), eliminate time-constant unobservables.
  - Placebo events test for (i) effects away from childbirth and (ii) selection on earnings growth.


MAIN RESULTS

First Stage: Instrument Predicts WFH Adoption



WFH trends


Remotability Raises Mothers' Earnings Around Childbirth




Panel A. Earnings

Placebos | Robustness

...Driven by Higher Weeks Worked




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
Panel B. Weeks worked

Placebos | Robustness

Remotability Reduces Earnings Penalty




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
Panel B. Weeks worked

Placebos Robustness

Also at Longer Horizons




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
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Placebos | Robustness

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
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
Panel B. Weeks worked

Placebos | Robustness

Higher Work Input Compensates Reduction in Parental Leave




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
No Employment Effects



Panel C. Employment

Log changes


No Employment Effects, Lower Part-Time



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
No Employment Effects, Lower Part-Time and No Change in Employer




Panel C. Employment

Log changes

...Within Ongoing Jobs There Is an Increase in the Promotion Rate



Panel C. Employment



Panel D. Promotions to managerial jobs


Log changes

Magnitude: IV Interpretation

- The IV estimates identify mothers induced into WFH by sector–location exposure.
- Holding a WFH contract raises the earnings change around childbirth by ∼3,900 euros.
- This offsets about 77% of the average childbirth earnings drop (27% of pre-birth earnings).
- Expressed as a motherhood-penalty reduction, the effect is 29–34 percentage points.


Main table Child penalty

Larger Effects for



Levels | First stage: mothers | First stage: fathers

Larger Effects for More Constrained Mothers




Levels | First stage: mothers | First stage: fathers

Larger Effects for Mothers in More Constrained Households




Levels | First stage: mothers | First stage: fathers

Larger Effects for Mothers in More Inflexible Jobs




Levels | First stage: mothers | First stage: fathers

WFH Adoption Is Much Higher Where Gender Norms Are Progressive



First stage: fathers | 2SLS: gender norms | 2SLS: female share


...and in Firms That Employ Relatively Fewer Women



First stage: fathers | 2SLS: gender norms | 2SLS: female share

HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL RESULTS


Fathers Do Not Benefit from More Remotable Jobs...




Panel A. Fathers' earnings response to own WFH exposure

Weeks | Household placebo | Household table | Gender norms

...But Fathers' Remotability Helps Mothers in Similar Way



Panel A. Fathers' earnings response to own WFH exposure



Panel B. Mothers' earnings response to both exposures

FERTILITY RESPONSES

Flexible Work and Fertility

- Fertility is a joint household decision
  - If WFH reduces the labor-market cost of children, births should increase.

Flexible Work and Fertility


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  - Higher-order fertility mainly depends on absorbing extra childcare needs.

Flexible Work and Fertility


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- The response should be stronger for additional births than for first births.
  - Higher-order fertility mainly depends on absorbing extra childcare needs.
- We compare pre- and post-COVID cohorts of working women over four years.
- The outcome is residual cumulative fertility, net of pre-COVID exposure trends.

$$F_{it} = \alpha_{s(i)} + \lambda_t + \sum_{k=2017}^{2024} \beta_k 1\{t = k\} \times \text{Remotable}_{s(i)} + \sum_{k=2017}^{2024} \gamma_k 1\{t = k\} \times X_{\tilde{s}(i)} + \varepsilon_{it}$$

Fertility Increases for First-Time Mothers and at Higher Parity



Panel A. Incumbent mothers



Panel B. First-time mothers

Fertility table | Sector fertility | Back-of-envelope

FLEXIBLE WORK AND THE GENDER EARNINGS GAP

Gender Earnings Gap Counterfactual

- Goal: quantify how much WFH can slow the lifecycle widening of the gender gap.

Gender Earnings Gap Counterfactual


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- We focus on cohorts born in 1974–1979, observed before the WFH shock.
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  - Outcome: female-to-male average earnings ratio by age.

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  - Keep workers with at least 3 years of private-sector work before age 30.
  - Build a balanced panel from age 25 to 40.
  - Outcome: female-to-male average earnings ratio by age.
- Counterfactuals adjust mothers' post-birth earnings using the estimated penalty profile.
  - No motherhood penalty: fully remove the event-time earnings loss.
  - Current WFH: apply the WFH-induced penalty reduction at observed adoption.
  - Potential WFH: apply the same reduction to all remotable jobs.


Child penalty Remotability

Gender Earnings Gap Widens Over the Life Cycle




Child penalty | Remotability

Motherhood Penalty Accounts for Virtually All the Widening




Child penalty | Remotability

Current WFH Adoption Reduces 11% of Gender Gap Widening



Child penalty | Remotability

WFH Reduces Up To 29% of Gender Gap Increase If Fully Adopted



Child penalty | Remotability

Conclusion

- Rigid workplace organization is a first-order driver of the motherhood penalty.
- WFH offsets a large share of mothers' earnings losses after childbirth.
  - The main channel is stronger attachment within ongoing jobs.
  - Larger effects for more constrained mothers in more constrained households.
  - Take-up is higher where gender norms are progressive, but effects do not differ.

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  - Fathers' flexibility helps mothers even when fathers' earnings do not move.
- Flexible work also affects fertility and the lifecycle gender earnings gap.
- WFH cannot eliminate gender inequality, but it can meaningfully slow its growth.

APPENDIX

Theoretical Framework

- Childbirth tightens a household time constraint.
  - Childcare raises both time needs and coordination costs.
- Rigid workplace arrangements make the constraint more costly.
  - Fixed schedules, commuting, and presence requirements reduce feasible work.
- Flexible work lowers the cost of combining work and childcare.
- The model predicts gains in weeks worked, full-time attachment, and career continuity.
- Fathers' flexibility is informative about whether the constraint is household-level.


Back

Predictions

Predictions


- Flexibility should reduce mothers' earnings losses around childbirth.
  - Effects should appear when childcare constraints become binding.
- The main margin should be labor supply within employment.
- Effects should be larger where rigidity is more costly.
  - Commuters, greedy jobs, younger mothers, and lower earners.
- Fathers' exposure improve mothers' outcomes if constraints are household-level.
- Fertility should rise if flexibility lowers the expected cost of children.

WFH Diffusion in Italy




Back

Exclusion Restriction: Firms and Coworkers



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
First-Stage Heterogeneity: Fathers



Back


Mothers

Heterogeneity in WFH Effects: Levels




Back

Placebo Events: Mothers




Back

Placebo Household Exposure




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Household Exposure: Mothers' Weeks Worked




Back

Log Changes in Labor-Market Outcomes




Back

Motherhood Penalty: Two Benchmarks



Short-Run Penalty = 0.469. Long-Run Penalty = 0.389.
N = 97,554,152. Workers = 4,572,672.

Panel A. Mothers vs. fathers




Short-Run Penalty = 0.496. Long-Run Penalty = 0.343.
N = 12,184,316. Workers = 413,775.

Panel B. Mothers vs. non-mothers

Back

Sector-Level Fertility Response




Back

Back-of-the-Envelope: Aggregate Fertility

- Combine IV fertility estimates with age-specific changes in WFH exposure.
- Let g index first-time and incumbent mothers, and a index age
  $\Delta B_a^{(4)} = \sum_g \hat{\beta}_g \Delta WFH_{ga} P_{ga}^E$
- Convert four-year implied births into an annual TFR effect $\Delta TFR = \sum_a \frac{\Delta B_a^{(4)}/4}{N_a}$
- Observed WFH diffusion implies about 4,700 additional births per year.
  - This corresponds to a TFR increase of 0.014, or 1.2% of the 2024 level.
- Full WFH adoption in remotable jobs implies about 15,200 extra births per year.
  - This corresponds to a TFR increase of 0.046, or 3.9% of the 2024 level.

Back

Remotability and Mothers at Age 40



Back

Descriptive Statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All		Households	
	Mothers	Fathers	Mothers	Fathers
Age	32.536	34.309	31.918	34.525
	(4.913)	(6.156)	(4.778)	(5.609)
Full-time	0.589	0.831	0.620	0.865
	(0.492)	(0.374)	(0.485)	(0.342)
Permanent	0.863	0.811	0.862	0.856
	(0.344)	(0.392)	(0.345)	(0.351)
Manager	0.020	0.033	0.020	0.043
	(0.141)	(0.179)	(0.141)	(0.202)
Weeks worked	34.956	37.101	36.365	40.533
	(18.853)	(19.931)	(18.439)	(18.168)
Earnings	16,530.982	20,192.350	17,230.613	22,975.725
	(13,024.498)	(18,038.508)	(12,695.311)	(18,458.016)
Prob. WFH	0.064	0.058	0.076	0.073
	(0.222)	(0.205)	(0.240)	(0.229)
South	0.252	0.289	0.224	0.223
	(0.434)	(0.453)	(0.417)	(0.416)
Industry	0.193	0.420	0.199	0.423
	(0.395)	(0.494)	(0.399)	(0.494)
Firm size 1–14	0.390	0.315	0.362	0.287
	(0.488)	(0.465)	(0.481)	(0.453)
Firm size 15–99	0.240	0.295	0.246	0.291
	(0.427)	(0.456)	(0.430)	(0.454)
Firm size 100+	0.370	0.390	0.392	0.421
	(0.483)	(0.488)	(0.488)	(0.494)
Coworker earnings	18,621.186	21,737.113	19,207.725	23,838.791
	(14,103.524)	(14,602.819)	(14,250.261)	(15,150.148)
Male coworker earnings	22,549.172	22,954.246	23,207.078	25,316.705
	(17,510.879)	(16,205.376)	(17,573.365)	(16,938.035)
Value added per worker	46.144	57.320	47.724	62.121
	(51.649)	(55.061)	(52.567)	(57.308)
Sales per worker	204.695	236.206	211.845	261.419
	(338.566)	(333.992)	(344.697)	(351.550)
Number of workers	796,174	938,667	428,397	428,397

Back

Reduced Form and 2SLS Estimates

	(1) Earnings	(2) Net earnings	(3) Net earnings $t+2$	(4) Weeks	(5) Net weeks	(6) PL weeks	(7) Employed	(8) Employed full-year	(9) Part-time	(10) Promoted post
					Panel A: Reduced form					
Remotable × Post	978.57***	512.86***	501.45***	0.53***	0.70***	-0.71***	-0.001	0.015***	-0.022***	0.003***
	(149.84)	(105.81)	(110.20)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Dep. var. mean	11395	-5105	-3257	25.6	-9.39	11.6	.86	.329	.457	.00192
Observations	770,625	770,625	679,226	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	661,562	661,562
					Panel B: 2SLS					
WFH × Post	7502.35***	3931.92***	3905.43***	4.05***	5.36***	-5.46***	-0.008	0.118***	-0.162***	0.023***
	(1106.84)	(826.34)	(909.99)	(1.02)	(1.18)	(0.71)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.004)
First stage	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***	0.130***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
KP F-stat	360.361	360.361	331.545	360.361	360.361	360.361	360.361	360.361	363.513	363.513
Dep. var. mean	11395	-5105	-3257	25.6	-9.39	11.6	.86	.329	.457	.00192
Observations	770,625	770,625	679,226	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	661,562	661,562

◂ Back

Robustness

Robustness of the Reduced-Form Estimates

	(1) Earnings	(2) Net earnings	(3) Net earnings t + 2	(4) Net earnings t + 3	(5) Weeks	(6) Net weeks	(7) PL weeks	(8) Employed	(9) Employed full-year	(10) Part-time	(11) Changed firm	(12) Promoted post
Panel A: Baseline												
Remotable × Post	978.57***	512.86***	501.45***	404.21***	0.53***	0.70***	-0.71***	-0.001	0.015***	-0.022***	0.001	0.003***
	(149.84)	(105.81)	(110.20)	(138.31)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Dep. var. mean	11395	-5105	-3257	-3810	25.6	-9.39	11.6	.86	.329	.457	.236	.00192
Observations	770,625	770,625	679,226	586,215	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	661,562	770,625	661,562
Panel B: Location-by-year fixed effects												
Remotable × Post	946.86***	473.57***	463.97***	425.10***	0.62***	0.52***	-0.58***	0.002	0.016***	-0.017***	0.002	0.002***
	(141.15)	(111.76)	(123.38)	(146.97)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.10)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Dep. var. mean	11395	-5105	-3257	-3810	25.6	-9.39	11.6	.86	.329	.457	.236	.00192
Observations	770,624	770,624	679,227	586,216	770,624	770,624	770,624	770,624	770,624	661,561	770,624	661,561
Panel C: Control for urbanization in the commuting zone												
Remotable × Post	1015.45***	435.42***	402.98***	327.54**	0.58***	0.47***	-0.58***	-0.000	0.015***	-0.019***	0.001	0.003***
	(164.72)	(117.29)	(122.26)	(153.03)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Dep. var. mean	11395	-5105	-3257	-3810	25.6	-9.39	11.6	.86	.329	.457	.236	.00192
Observations	770,624	770,624	679,227	586,216	770,624	770,624	770,624	770,624	770,624	661,561	770,624	661,561
Panel D: Commuting zone of residence												
Remotable × Post	644.96***	220.96**	283.74**	228.28	0.20*	0.32**	-0.51***	-0.002	0.007**	-0.013***	0.005*	0.002***
	(149.75)	(109.40)	(113.51)	(144.64)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Dep. var. mean	11361	-5078	-3233	-3787	25.5	-9.36	11.6	.86	.328	.459	.236	.00193
Observations	762,064	762,064	671,002	578,466	762,064	762,064	762,064	762,064	762,064	653,501	762,064	653,501
Panel E: Wild boostrap cluster at year level												
Remotable × Post	978.57***	512.86***	501.45***	404.21***	0.53**	0.70**	-0.71***	-0.001	0.015***	-0.022***	0.001	0.003***
	(192.71)	(161.65)	(109.59)	(182.25)	(0.18)	(0.32)	(0.07)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Dep. var. mean	11395	-5105	-3257	-3810	25.6	-9.39	11.6	.86	.329	.457	.236	.00192
Observations	770,625	770,625	679,226	586,215	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	661,562	770,625	661,562

Back
Main table
Household sample

Robustness: Household Sample

	(1) Earnings	(2) Net earnings	(3) Net earnings t + 2	(4) Net earnings t + 3	(5) Weeks	(6) Net weeks	(7) PL weeks	(8) Employed	(9) Employed full-year	(10) Part-time	(11) Changed firm	(12) Promoted post
	Panel A: Baseline											
Remotable × Post	978.57***	512.86***	501.45***	404.21***	0.53***	0.70***	-0.71***	-0.001	0.015***	-0.022***	0.001	0.003***
	(149.84)	(105.81)	(110.20)	(138.31)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Dep. var. mean	11395	-5105	-3257	-3810	25.6	-9.39	11.6	.86	.329	.457	.236	.00192
Observations	770,625	770,625	679,226	586,215	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	770,625	661,562	770,625	661,562
	Panel B: Mothers in household											
Remotable × Post	1123.04***	452.00***	520.15***	384.17**	0.60***	0.49**	-0.78***	-0.000	0.019***	-0.026***	0.000	0.004***
	(184.68)	(127.69)	(140.32)	(172.08)	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.001)
Dep. var. mean	11752	-5655	-3551	-4199	26.5	-10.3	12.1	.867	.349	.429	.233	.00197
Observations	405,844	405,844	350,834	295,412	405,844	405,844	405,844	405,844	405,844	350,485	405,844	350,485

Back

Household Exposure: Baseline and Interaction

	(1) Baseline	(2) Interaction
Remotable^{m} × Post	318.36** (124.87)	272.31** (135.06)
Remotable^{f} × Post	283.41*** (101.96)	236.74* (122.43)
Remotable^{m} × Remotable^{f} × Post		77.56 (163.27)
Mean Dep. Var	-5655	-5655
Observations	405,843	405,843

Household Exposure: Heterogeneity by Gender Norms

	(1) Gender norms
Remotable^{m} × Post × Below median GNI	457.08*** (147.36)
Remotable^{m} × Post × Above median GNI	-27.12 (147.69)
Remotable^{f} × Post × Below median GNI	400.06*** (135.75)
Remotable^{f} × Post × Above median GNI	21.07 (122.14)
Difference m: Above vs below median GNI	-484.20*** [-2.76]
Difference f: Above vs below median GNI	-378.98** [-2.09]
Mean Dep. Var	-5655
Observations	405,807

Heterogeneity for Gender Norms

	First-stage	Reduced-form	2SLS	Pre-2020 earnings at t − 2
Panel A: Gender norms index				
Progressive	0.15***	666.59***	4103.51***	18977.24
	(0.01)	(129.50)	(925.87)	
Conservative	0.04***	99.82	3389.45**	13961.95
	(0.01)	(110.48)	(1664.68)	
KP F-stat	36.331			
Difference: Conservative vs Progressive		-566.768***	-714.060	
		[-3.858]	[-0.652]	
Difference (%): Conservative vs Progressive		-0.028***	0.027	
		[-3.103]	[0.308]	
Observations	770,555	770,555	770,555	
Panel B: Father's parental leave				
Low takeup	0.05***	248.80**	4695.92***	14387.06
	(0.01)	(107.58)	(1534.44)	
High takeup	0.15***	600.65***	4153.31***	18579.96
	(0.01)	(128.71)	(932.70)	
KP F-stat	50.752			
Difference: High vs Low takeup		351.855***	-542.610	
		[2.594]	[-0.566]	
Difference (%): High vs Low takeup		0.015*	-0.103	
		[1.830]	[-1.418]	
Observations	770,246	770,246	770,246	

Heterogeneity for Female Share

	First-stage	Reduced-form	2SLS	Pre-2020 earnings at t − 2
Panel A: Firm's female share				
Below median	0.18***	821.01***	4350.63***	19004.72
	(0.01)	(156.62)	(859.57)	
Above median	0.07***	193.14*	3364.50***	14104.66
	(0.01)	(103.10)	(1116.32)	
KP F-stat	117.000			
Difference: Above vs below median		-627.870***	-986.133	
		[-3.690]	[-1.107]	
Difference (%): Above vs below median		-0.030***	0.010	
		[-2.978]	[0.155]	
Observations	769,520	769,520	769,520	
Panel B: Firm's female relative share				
Below sector median	0.17***	737.32***	4285.06***	17642.96
	(0.01)	(130.19)	(802.65)	
Above sector median	0.08***	249.90**	3662.89***	15326.23
	(0.01)	(117.39)	(1051.70)	
KP F-stat	168.346			
Difference: Above vs below sector median		-487.420***	-622.163	
		[-3.712]	[-0.995]	
Difference (%): Above vs below sector median		-0.025***	-0.004	
		[-3.205]	[-0.093]	
Observations	769,520	769,520	769,520	

Back

Gender norms

Fertility: Reduced Form and 2SLS Estimates

	First-stage	Reduced-form	2SLS	Mean outcome
		Panel A: Women with kids		
Post 2020 cohort	0.098***	0.012***	0.121***	0.803
	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.019)	
KP F-stat	382.013			
Observations	6,705,168	6,705,168	6,705,168	
		Panel B: Women without kids		
Post 2020 cohort	0.112***	0.004***	0.036***	1.174
	(0.006)	(0.001)	(0.011)	
KP F-stat	297.090			
Observations	17,182,532	17,182,532	17,182,532	
		Panel C: Sector-location level fertility		
Total	0.089***	0.216***	2.421***	37.366
	(0.002)	(0.048)	(0.548)	
Age 18-26	0.048***	0.011**	0.228**	2.558
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.099)	
Age 27-35	0.086***	0.155***	1.812***	23.422
	(0.002)	(0.030)	(0.355)	
Age 36+	0.095***	0.050**	0.527**	11.386
	(0.002)	(0.020)	(0.216)	
KP F-stat	2,586.275			
Observations	2,928,000	2,928,000	2,928,000	

Back