Flexibility for Both Parents: Remote Work and the Evolution of Child Penalties

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Remote Work Conference
October 28, 2026

Research Summary

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Research Question

Did greater exposure to remote work reduce the child penalty in Sweden?

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3. **Household labor supply model** (not today): remote work changes several margins at once $\rightarrow$ the effect on the child penalty is theoretically ambiguous

Literature

1. **Child penalties and gender earnings gaps**
   - Angelov, Johansson, and Lindahl (2016); Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010); Blau and Kahn (2017); Bang (2021); Goldin (2014); Hotz, Johansson, and Karimi (2018); Kleven et al. (2019, 2021); Cortés and Pan (2023); Kleven et al. (2025); Kleven (forthcoming)
   - **This paper:** framework to evaluate implications of flexibility for gender equality; household model to micro-found couples' labor supply choices

2. **Remote work, productivity, and labor supply**
   - Mas and Pallais (2017, 2020); Barrero et al. (2021); Mongey et al. (2021); Aksoy et al. (2022); Brynjolfsson et al. (2022); Bloom et al. (2015, 2024); Emanuel et al. (2023); Emanuel and Harrington (2024); Bailey et al. (2023)
   - **This paper:** build on observed labor supply responses to examine effects on child penalties

3. **Remote work, flexibility and women's labor supply**
   - Cubas et al. (2023); Harrington and Kahn (2023); Jalota and Ho (2024); Noray (2024); Goldin et al. (2025); Berresheim (2026); Gallen et al. (2026); Gulek and Langer (2026) **Italy:** see e.g. Del Boca et al. (2020); Basso et al. (2026); Crescenzi et al. (2026)
   - **This paper:** population-wide administrative data with links between spouses

Setting and Data

Family policy and the child penalty in Sweden

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$\longrightarrow$ Sweden is a setting where **temporal flexibility** is particularly relevant for reducing child penalties

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Remote work expanded while childcare largely remained available

$\longrightarrow$ Makes Sweden particularly well suited for studying whether greater workplace flexibility reduces the child penalty.

Data

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- **Labor market outcomes**
  - Employer-employee linkages (incl. firm and workplace ID)
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  - Occupational codes, industry codes
  - Wage rates and contracted hours (full public sector and 40% sample of private sector workers)
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  - Full parental leave spells
- **Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics**
  - Links to parents, partners, and children
  - Educational background (graduation year, university, education level and field)
  - Home and work location (250 $\times$ 250 meter coordinates), place of birth

▸ Sample

Data

EU Labor Force Survey (LFS): large-scale annual survey that includes questions about remote work

- **Remote work adoption:** share of Swedish workers in each 2-digit ISCO-08 occupation who report *any* work from home
- **Remote work exposure:** change in adoption from 2019 to 2022
- Occupations split at the **median** of exposure: low v. high

▸ Exposure by occupation ▸ WFH Measures

Sample


- First-time parents whose child was born in Sweden
  - Pre-pandemic cohorts: 2010–2016; post-pandemic cohorts: 2020–2023
  - 2017–2019 are only partially exposed to the pandemic: excluded from the comparison
- Aged 25-45 at childbirth
- Each parent has a reported occupation two years before entering parenthood
- WFH exposure assigned by occupation in $t-2$
  - **Mother's exposure**: low v. high (fathers compared within the mother's group)
  - **Couple types**: both low; only father high; only mother high; both high

▸ Sample

Descriptive Facts


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Fact 2: parents match assortatively on remote work exposure

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Empirics

Empirical Framework

We estimate separately by gender and occupational exposure category:

$$Y_{it}^{go} = \boldsymbol{\alpha^{go}} \cdot \underbrace{\boldsymbol{D_{it}^{event}}}_{\substack{\text{event time} \\ \text{indicators}}} + \varphi^{go} \cdot \underbrace{D_{it}^{post}}_{\substack{\text{post-WFH-} \\ \text{adoption} \\ \text{indicator}}} + \boldsymbol{\delta^{go}} \cdot \underbrace{\boldsymbol{D_{it}^{event \times post}}}_{\substack{\text{event time} \times \\ \text{post-WFH-adoption}}} +$$

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
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Our objects of estimation are:

- The child penalty before the pandemic α^{go}
- The child penalty after the pandemic $\alpha^{go} + \delta^{go}$
- Together these give us the differential changes in child penalty for women vs. men in high- vs low-exposure groups

Employment: the short-run penalty fell by about 30%...

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


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Event study: 2010–16 and 2020–23



3-DiD: 2020–23 minus 2010–16




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


Short-run penalty: 5.7% (2010–16) $\rightarrow$ 4.1% (2020–23); $\Delta = -1.7$ pp $[-2.0, -1.4]$


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
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


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


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Δ short-run penalty: -1.4 pp $[-1.8, -0.9]$ vs. -1.7 pp $[-2.1, -1.4]$

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


High − low: -0.4 pp $[-0.9, 0.2]$ $\rightarrow$ the penalty fell equally in both groups


▸ Mothers vs fathers


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



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


Contracted hours among the working: 6.8% $\rightarrow$ 5.5%; $\Delta = -1.4$ pp $[-1.8, -0.9]$


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
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


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


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Δ short-run penalty: -1.9 pp $[-2.6, -1.1]$ vs. -0.9 pp $[-1.4, -0.5]$

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


High − low: +1.0 pp [0.1, 1.9] → the penalty fell *less* for high-exposure mothers

▸ Mothers vs fathers


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


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


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


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
Short-run wage-income penalty: 36.7% $\rightarrow$ 32.7%; $\Delta = -4.0$ pp $[-4.7, -3.3]$

Total earnings (incl. benefits): 10.8% $\rightarrow$ 10.5%; $\Delta = -0.2$ pp $[-0.9, 0.4]$ $\rightarrow$ unchanged


▸ Total earnings ▸ Raw ▸ Normalization


By mother's exposure: wage income

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


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


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
Δ short-run penalty: -1.9 pp $[-3.1, -0.8]$ vs. -4.8 pp $[-5.7, -3.9]$

By mother's exposure: wage income



High − low: -2.8 pp $[-4.3, -1.4]$ $\rightarrow$ the penalty fell 2.8 pp more for high-exposure mothers

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. . . but **not in total earnings**: high − low -0.4 pp $[-1.7, 0.8]$

▸ Mothers vs fathers ▸ Total earnings

The wage-income penalty fell most in dual-high-exposure couples

Couple type	Employment	Hours (working)	Wage income
Both low	−1.2	−1.8	−1.4
	[−1.8, −0.6]	[−2.9, −0.8]	[−2.8, −0.1]
Only father high	−1.6	−1.9	−2.5
	[−2.3, −0.9]	[−3.0, −0.8]	[−4.3, −0.7]
Only mother high	−2.1	−0.3	−4.2
	[−2.7, −1.6]	[−1.2, 0.7]	[−5.8, −2.7]
Both high	−1.4	−1.2	−4.9
	[−1.8, −1.0]	[−1.7, −0.7]	[−6.0, −3.8]

Δ short-run penalty ($t + 0$ to $t + 3$), 2020–23 minus 2010–16, pp; each parent's child effect in % of own counterfactual (same couple type and cohort). Negative = smaller penalty. 95% CIs in brackets, clustered by couple.

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- **Hours:** no decline when *only the mother* is highly exposed (−0.3 pp)
- **Wage income:** from −1.4 pp (both low) to −4.2 pp (only mother high) and −4.9 pp (both high)

▸ Differences ▸ Employment ▸ Hours ▸ Wage income ▸ Total earnings ▸ Mothers vs fathers

Summary and Next Steps

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Summary

- After 2020, child penalties in employment and hours declined, but no evidence that remote work drove these declines in mothers' labor supply
- Mothers who were exposed to remote work lost less *wage income* right after birth, but not less *total earnings* $\rightarrow$ less paid leave?
- Remote work did not shrink the child penalty in mothers' labor supply, but it may have changed how mothers combine paid leave and work

Next steps: mechanisms

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How can we reconcile less wage income loss with unchanged total earnings?

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- **Parental leave spells:** shorter or part-time leave, earlier return to work?
- **Temporary parental leave** (VAB, care of sick children): does remote work replace days on temporary leave?
- **Monthly wage income** (employer declarations, 2019–2023): timing of the return to work within the year of birth

Thank you!


Email: dana.scott@yale.edu

What each step assumes

Step	Identifying assumption
1. Effect of first child	Smooth counterfactual given age and year effects; no anticipation before $t-1$
2. Child penalty	The contrast of two effects – bias common to mothers and fathers cancels
3. Change across cohorts	Descriptive: includes the pandemic *and* longer-run trends
4. High vs low exposure	Without the extra rise in remote work, the penalty would have changed equally in both groups
	No *other* pandemic channel differs by exposure – trends common to both groups cancel

▸ Parental leave ▸ Sorting & fertility ◂ Back


Mothers vs fathers: who drives the 4-DiD?



High minus low mother's exposure, 2020–23 vs. 2010–16; each parent in % of own counterfactual (same group and cohort). **Grey:** fathers' part. **Orange:** mothers' part (above zero = high-exposure mothers lost *less* after birth). **Black:** 4-DiD = grey − orange. 95% CIs clustered by couple.

▸ Raw, by couple type ◂ Results ◂ Couples

Mothers vs fathers: who drives the 4-DiD?




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- **Wage income** (-2.8 pp): mothers $\approx +1.8$ pp of mothers' earnings, fathers ≈ -1.1 pp of fathers' earnings $\rightarrow$ mostly **mothers**, at $t+0$ and $t+1$


▸ Raw, by couple type ◂ Results ◂ Couples

Couple types: wage income, 4-DiD between couple types


Only father high – both low




Only mother high – both low



Both high – both low





Only mother high – only father high



▸ Total earnings ◂ Back

Mothers and fathers: employment by mother's exposure






Event-study estimates for mothers and fathers, first births 2010–16 and 2020–23; fathers are assigned their partner's group. Each line in % of that parent's own counterfactual (same group and cohort); the penalty is the gap between the lines.

▸ Couple types ◂ Results ◂ Low vs high


Mothers and fathers: hours among the working by mother's exposure




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Couple types | Results | Low vs high

Mothers and fathers: wage income by mother's exposure








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
▸ Couple types ◂ Results ◂ Low vs high

Mothers and fathers: employment by couple type













▸ Mother's exposure ◂ Couples

Mothers and fathers: hours among the working by couple type













▸ Mother's exposure ◂ Couples

Mothers and fathers: wage income by couple type










▸ Total earnings ▸ Mother's exposure ◂ Couples


Fathers took more parental leave, mothers less





- Year after birth ($t+1$), 2010–16 $\rightarrow$ 2020–23: mothers $\sim$132 $\rightarrow$ $\sim$124 days; fathers $\sim$61 $\rightarrow$ $\sim$67 (at $t+3$: $\sim$31 $\rightarrow$ $\sim$37)
- Consistent with the framework: freed-up time can go to *home production*, including for fathers

◂ Assumptions

Job sorting and fertility







- No shift in job or occupation mobility around birth $\rightarrow$ no evidence that mothers moved into remote-friendly jobs
- Share with a birth at $t+2$ and $t+3$ ($\sim$26–29%) similar across cohorts $\rightarrow$ later event years not driven by a fertility response

◂ Assumptions

Model: household time allocation with remote work

A couple ($i \in \{m, f\}$) chooses paid work h_i, home work n_i, leisure l_i and remote work $F_i \in \{0, 1\}$:


$$\max \quad \lambda \ln l_m + (1-\lambda) \ln l_f + \gamma_K \ln C + \theta_K \ln G$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Time:} \quad & h_i \left(1 + c\,(1 - F_i)\right) + n_i + l_i = 1 \\
\text{Consumption:} \quad & C = \textstyle\sum_i w_i\, h_i\, (1 - \delta_i F_i) \\
\text{Home production:} \quad & G = \left(\beta_m n_m^{\rho} + \beta_f(F_f)\, n_f^{\rho}\right)^{1/\rho}, \qquad \beta_f(1) > \beta_f(0)
\end{aligned}$$

- c: commuting time per hour of paid work, saved when working remotely
- δ_i: productivity penalty of remote work $\rightarrow$ remote work raises the return to paid time if $(1 - \delta_f)(1 + c) > 1$
- Children raise γ_K and θ_K; penalty = fall in h_f at birth
- Current version: only the mother chooses F

Calibration Back

Calibration: change in mothers' hours penalty with remote work



ΔMP in pp of hours, by commuting cost c (x-axis) and remote-work productivity penalty δ_f (y-axis). Mothers who work remotely both before and after birth: small reductions (up to 1.5 pp); mothers who switch after birth: large increases (20–30 pp).

Back


Cohorts


First birth	Years observed ($t-3$ to $t+3$)	Pandemic reached at	Role
2010–2016	2007–2019	never	**pre**
2017–2019	2014–2022	$t+3$, $t+2$, $t+1$	omitted
2020–2023	2017–2023*	$t=0$ or earlier	**post**


*Data end in 2023: the 2021, 2022 and 2023 cohorts are observed up to $t+2$, $t+1$ and $t=0$.


- 2017–2019 births are *partly* treated within the window $\rightarrow$ left out of the main comparison

Back


2019-2021: Δ always vs. Δ any
Above/below median (Δ always)
1
2
39%
8%
5%
48%
1
2
Above/below median (Δ any)



2019-2022: Δ always vs. Δ any
Above/below median (Δ always)
1
2
38%
1%
8%
53%
1
2
Above/below median (Δ any)


Δ always: 2019 to 2021 vs. 2022
Above/below median (2021)
1
2
38%
9%
1%
51%
1
2
Above/below median (2022)


Δ any: 2019 to 2021 vs. 2022
Above/below median (2021)
1
2
40%
4%
5%
51%
1
2
Above/below median (2022)

Back

Remote work by occupation: 2019, 2021 and 2022



Share working from home sometimes or always, by 2-digit ISCO-08 occupation (EU-LFS, Sweden).

Back

Normalization (1/3): penalty and 3-DiD

1. Kleven et al. (2019)

Child penalty at event time t:

$$P_t \;=\; \frac{\hat{\alpha}_t^m - \hat{\alpha}_t^w}{\hat{\mathbb{E}}\left[\tilde{Y}_{ist}^w \mid t\right]}$$

$\hat{\alpha}_t^g$: event-time coefficient, gender g;
denominator: **women's counterfactual**
(predicted outcome absent children)

2. This paper: own base, by cohort

Each parent in % of **own** counterfactual, by cohort (Kleven et al. 2025):

$$P_{c,t} \;=\; \frac{\hat{\alpha}_{c,t}^m}{\tilde{Y}_{c,t}^m} - \frac{\hat{\alpha}_{c,t}^w}{\tilde{Y}_{c,t}^w}, \qquad c \in \{\text{pre}, \text{post}\}$$

3-DiD: $\Delta P_t = P_{\text{post},t} - P_{\text{pre},t}$

\+ Unchanged % effects give $\Delta P_t = 0$, even if earnings grow between cohorts

· Penalty = mothers' % loss − fathers' % loss (not a gap in kronor)

· Linear in the $\hat{\alpha}$'s (counterfactuals held fixed) → exact SEs

▸ Other normalizations ◂ Back

Normalization (2/3): 4-DiD

Within each exposure group $o \in \{\text{low}, \text{high}\}$ and cohort c, each parent's counterfactual **of the same group and cohort**:

$$P^o_{c,t} = \frac{\hat{\alpha}^{m,o}_{c,t}}{\tilde{Y}^{m,o}_{c,t}} - \frac{\hat{\alpha}^{w,o}_{c,t}}{\tilde{Y}^{w,o}_{c,t}}, \qquad \Delta P^o_t = P^o_{\text{post},t} - P^o_{\text{pre},t}, \qquad \text{4-DiD}_t = \Delta P^{\text{high}}_t - \Delta P^{\text{low}}_t$$

Mothers vs fathers: an exact split, $\text{4-DiD}_t = D^m_t - D^w_t$, with

$$D^g_t = \left(\frac{\hat{\alpha}^{g,\text{high}}_{\text{post},t}}{\tilde{Y}^{g,\text{high}}_{\text{post},t}} - \frac{\hat{\alpha}^{g,\text{high}}_{\text{pre},t}}{\tilde{Y}^{g,\text{high}}_{\text{pre},t}}\right) - \left(\frac{\hat{\alpha}^{g,\text{low}}_{\text{post},t}}{\tilde{Y}^{g,\text{low}}_{\text{post},t}} - \frac{\hat{\alpha}^{g,\text{low}}_{\text{pre},t}}{\tilde{Y}^{g,\text{low}}_{\text{pre},t}}\right)$$

- D^m: fathers' part, in % of fathers' earnings; D^w: mothers' part, in % of mothers' earnings

\+ Neither level differences nor different wage growth between the groups enter mechanically

Back

Normalization (3/3): only the earnings changes depend on it


		Women's base, fixed 2010–16	Women's base, own cohort	Own base, own cohort
Employment	3-DiD	−1.7 [−2.0, −1.4]	−1.7 [−2.0, −1.4]	−1.7 [−2.0, −1.4]
	4-DiD	−0.3 [−0.9, 0.2]	−0.4 [−0.9, 0.2]	−0.4 [−0.9, 0.2]
Hours (working)	3-DiD	−1.2 [−1.7, −0.8]	−1.3 [−1.8, −0.9]	−1.4 [−1.8, −0.9]
	4-DiD	+0.9 [0.0, 1.8]	+1.0 [0.1, 1.9]	+1.0 [0.1, 1.9]
Wage income	3-DiD	−0.7 [−1.5, 0.1]	−4.1 [−4.8, −3.3]	−4.0 [−4.7, −3.3]
	4-DiD	−3.3 [−5.0, −1.6]	−2.7 [−4.3, −1.1]	−2.8 [−4.3, −1.4]
	Both high − both low	−5.1 [−7.2, −3.0]	−3.6 [−5.6, −1.6]	−3.4 [−5.2, −1.7]
Total earnings	3-DiD	+0.4 [−0.3, 1.1]	−0.5 [−1.2, 0.2]	−0.2 [−0.9, 0.4]
	4-DiD	−0.1 [−1.6, 1.3]	−0.4 [−1.8, 1.0]	−0.4 [−1.7, 0.8]


Short-run ($t+0$ to $t+3$), 2020–23 minus 2010–16, pp; 4-DiD = high minus low mother's exposure. 95% CIs clustered by couple. Same regressions; only the denominators differ.

- Women's counterfactual wage income is ≈10% higher for 2020–23 than for 2010–16 (employment: 0%, hours: ≈2%) → a fixed 2010–16 base inflates the later cohort's earnings penalty
- Employment and hours: the same under every normalization; the wage-income 4-DiD stays negative and significant

◂ Normalization ◂ Results

Raw profiles of the core outcomes








Raw means by gender and cohort group.


Back

Total earnings

Event study: 2010–16 and 2020–23



3-DiD: 2020–23 minus 2010–16




Short-run penalty: **10.8%** $\rightarrow$ **10.5%**; $\Delta = -0.2$ pp $[-0.9, 0.4]$


▸ By couple type ◂ Wage income ◂ Wage income by exposure

Total earnings

Event study: 2010–16 and 2020–23




4-DiD: high minus low exposure





Low $+0.2$ $[-0.8, 1.1]$ vs. high -0.3 $[-1.1, 0.6]$; High $-$ low: $\mathbf{-0.4}$ pp $[-1.7, 0.8]$ $\rightarrow$ the wage-income gradient does not carry over to total earnings


▸ By couple type ◂ Wage income ◂ Wage income by exposure

Couple types: employment (3-DiD)













▸ Mothers vs fathers ◂ Back

Couple types: hours among working parents (3-DiD)













▸ Mothers vs fathers ◂ Back

Couple types: wage income (3-DiD)













▸ Total earnings ▸ Mothers vs fathers ◂ Back

Couple types: total earnings (3-DiD)









▸ Table ▸ 4-DiD ▸ Mothers vs fathers ◂ Wage income ◂ Total earnings

Couple types: wage income vs. total earnings

	Wage income	Total earnings
Δ short-run penalty, 2020–23 minus 2010–16		
Both low	−1.4 [−2.8, −0.1]	+1.0 [−0.1, 2.2]
Only father high	−2.5 [−4.3, −0.7]	−0.9 [−2.5, 0.7]
Only mother high	−4.2 [−5.8, −2.7]	+1.3 [−0.1, 2.6]
Both high	−4.9 [−6.0, −3.8]	−1.0 [−2.0, 0.1]
Differences (4-DiD)		
Only father high − both low	−1.1 [−3.3, 1.2]	−1.9 [−3.9, 0.1]
Only mother high − both low	−2.8 [−4.9, −0.7]	+0.2 [−1.6, 2.0]
Both high − both low	−3.4 [−5.2, −1.7]	−2.0 [−3.6, −0.4]
Only mother high − only father high	−1.7 [−4.1, 0.7]	+2.1 [0.0, 4.3]


Short run ($t + 0$ to $t + 3$), pp; each parent in % of own counterfactual (same couple type and cohort). Total earnings include parental and sickness benefits. 95% CIs in brackets, clustered by couple.

- When only the mother is highly exposed: wage-income penalty −2.8 pp vs. both low, total earnings +0.2
- Both high: a smaller gradient in total earnings (−2.0) than in wage income (−3.4)


▸ 4-DiD figures ◂ Couples

Couple types: total earnings, 4-DiD between couple types


Only father high – both low




Only mother high – both low



Both high – both low





Only mother high – only father high





▸ Table ◂ Wage income

Mothers and fathers: total earnings by couple type










◂ Wage income ◂ Couples


Raw wage income by couple type




Raw means by gender and cohort group.

Back

Sample: cohort sizes and occupation coverage





Occupation coverage dips around the switch from SSYK96 to SSYK2012 (2014) $\rightarrow$ smaller 2016–17 cohorts, which need an occupation at $t-2$

◂ Data